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I.   INTRODUCTION 
[I]t is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science 
rests—that even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless 
anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a 
faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was 
also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine.1 
Human error there is bound to be, judges being men and women, 
and men and women being what they are.2 
                                                                                                                  
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2004; B.A., Geneva College 2000. Thanks to Professor Rob 
Atkinson for his very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article and Scott Coch-
ran, Seth Miller, and Chris Hamilton for their exemplary efforts in preparing this Article 
for publication. All errors in this draft are, of course, my own. 
 1. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE § 344, at 283 (Walter Kauffman trans., 
Random House 1974) (1887) (emphasis omitted). 
 2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 468 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Interest-
ingly, Rehnquist’s words were used not to support the majority’s concern with the arbi-
trariness and capriciousness in application of the death penalty, but rather to reinforce the 
risks posed by a human court in undermining the democratically-determined decisions of 
legislatures. See id.  
[A]n error in mistakenly sustaining the constitutionality of a particular enact-
ment, while wrongfully depriving the individual of a right secured to him by 
the Constitution, nonetheless does so by simply letting stand a duly enacted 
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 Three decades ago, the Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia,3 
held that the death penalty, as applied, was unconstitutional under 
the Eighth Amendment. While opinions varied among the justices, a 
plurality of the court focused on the “arbitrary” and “capricious” 
manner in which death sentences were imposed.4 Perhaps encapsu-
lating the Court’s sentiment best was Justice Stewart, who said: 
“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that 
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.”5 But the question 
remained: Could capital punishment be applied so as to adequately 
avoid “arbitrary” and “capricious” results? Four years later, the 
Court, in Gregg v. Georgia,6 answered this question in the affirmative 
after Georgia became the first of many states to reform its system in 
an effort to satisfy Furman.7 In essence, the Court in Gregg deter-
mined that the “lightning” of capital punishment had become suffi-
ciently precise for the state of Georgia to resume executions. Since 
Gregg, the Supreme Court has focused only on very specific aspects of 
capital punishment. Constitutionally speaking, the system of capital 
punishment has faced no real threats since Furman. 
 Nevertheless, chinks in the armor of capital punishment have be-
gun to show. This is due, in large measure, to the increased viability 
and utilization of DNA testing. In the much-discussed book, Actual 
Innocence,8 Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer illustrate 
some of our criminal justice system’s most basic flaws by relating the 
stories of several individuals whose convictions were overturned af-
ter DNA testing established their innocence. Some of these individu-
als were awaiting execution, making up but a few of an increasing 
                                                                                                                  
law of a democratically chosen legislative body. The error resulting from a mis-
taken upholding of an individual’s constitutional claim against the validity of a 
legislative enactment is a good deal more serious. For the result in such a case 
is not to leave standing a law duly enacted by a representative assembly, but to 
impose upon the Nation the judicial fiat of a majority of a court of judges whose 
connection with the popular will is remote at best. 
Id. Nevertheless, Rehnquist’s words ring true as they relate to the many human decisions 
that are made in the context of capital punishment. 
 3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 4. See id. at 248-49 (Douglas, J., concurring), 295 (Brennan, J., concurring), 309-10 
(Stewart, J., concurring).  
 5. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 6. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 7. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (approving the Texas death penalty 
system); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (validating the system in Florida). For a 
complete list of states that have executed persons since 1976, see Death Penalty Informa-
tion Center, Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=186 (last visited Dec. 6, 2003).  
 8. BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000). 
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number of death penalty inmates who have been exonerated due to 
the testing of DNA evidence.9  
 Accordingly, public confidence in capital punishment appears to 
be diminishing. Actions taken, or at least considered, by both states10 
and the federal government,11 popular polling12 and culture,13 as well 
as a few recent lower court decisions14 all suggest a fundamental re-
thinking of capital punishment. Most significantly, in Illinois, the ex-
onerations of thirteen death row inmates led Governor Ryan first to 
issue a moratorium on all executions and then, later, to grant a blan-
ket commutation to all death row prisoners.15 To some, Governor 
Ryan’s response is part of a larger movement in which, against the 
background of innocence, many people have begun to doubt whether 
the death penalty should be applied at all.16 Perhaps unlike other 
                                                                                                                  
 9. See id. at 218-20; Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death 
Penalty, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=412&scid=6 (last visited July 
30, 2003) [hereinafter Innocence and the Death Penalty]. Of the 111 exonerations from 
death row since 1973, nearly half (46%) have occurred since 1995. See id. 
 10. See, for example, Judith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligations 
of Prosecutors in Cases Involving Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 
389, 396-98 (2002), for a discussion of actions taken by states to improve prisoners’ access 
to post-conviction DNA testing. There was also, of course, the decision of Governor Ryan to 
issue a moratorium on executions in Illinois. See Raad Cawthon, Illinois Governor Puts 
Death Penalty on Hold; He Cites Fears of the Innocent Being Executed, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE , Feb. 1, 2000, at A6. Other states have likewise considered moratoriums. See, e.g., 
Sara Rimer, Support for a Moratorium in Executions Gets Stronger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 
2000, at A18.  
 11. See, e.g., Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S. 486, H.R. 912, 107th Cong.; Federal 
Death Penalty Abolition Act of 2001, S. 191, 107th Cong.; National Death Penalty Morato-
rium Act of 2001, S. 233, 107th Cong.; National Death Penalty Moratorium Act of 2000, S. 
2463, 106th Cong.; Federal Death Penalty Moratorium Act of 2000, H.R. 5236, 106th Cong. 
 12. See, e.g., Death Penalty Information Center, Summaries of Recent Poll Findings, 
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did=210#ABCNewsWashPost 
12403 (last visited Sept. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Summaries of Recent Poll Findings] (citing 
a Jan. 24, 2003, ABC News/Washington Post poll, which “found that while 64% of Ameri-
cans support the death penalty when no other alternative is offered, they remain divided 
on the appropriate punishment for those convicted of murder when given the option of life 
in prison.” But, “[w]hen given a choice, 49% percent [sic] choose the death penalty and 45% 
choose life in prison.” Also, “[t]he poll . . . revealed that 39% of respondents would like to 
see their governor issue a blanket commutation of death row inmates similar to that issued 
by Governor Ryan recently in Illinois.”). 
 13. See, e.g., The Oprah Winfrey Show: Death Penalty Controversy (Harpo Prods., Inc., 
Sept. 28, 2000), available at http://tapesandtranscripts.oprah.com/product.asp?Produ c-
tID=409566; THE LIFE OF DAVID GALE  (Universal Pictures 2003); Eric Slater, Illinois’ Ex-
onerated to Urge Clemency for All on Death Row , L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, at A56 (dis-
cussing th e play, The Exonerated, which has featured several Hollywood notables). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d , 
313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (FDPA) does not 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment), cert. denied, Quinones v. U.S., 
2003 WL 22052 095, 72 USLW 3371 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2003) (No. 03-6148). 
 15. Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, Clemency for All, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, at C1. 
 16. See, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak, Finality Without Fairness: Why We Are Moving To-
wards Moratoria on Executions, and the Potential Abolition of Capital Punishment, 33 
CONN. L. REV. 733, 739-43 (2001). 
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capital punishment issues, innocence is one that strikes a resounding 
chord with a politically relevant segment of the population.17 There is 
even some indication that, given a sufficient alternative, a near-
majority of Americans would approve of stopping executions alto-
gether.18  
 This recent shift in sentiment on capital punishment may be ex-
plained, in part, as a revisiting of an exceedingly simple but most 
fundamental framework for thinking about government—that is: 1) 
people make mistakes; 2) the costs of mistakes made by people en-
trusted with political power can be especially high; thus, 3) we 
should be extremely skeptical19 about the scope and nature of power 
we entrust to government. From this very simple paradigm comes an 
even simpler observation about its application to the death penalty: 
Our skepticism should be at its greatest where, as in the case of capi-
tal punishment, the grant of power to a fallible government is great-
est. Notably, this position is one that does not lend itself to conven-
tional political line-drawing. Even conservative commentator George 
Will, after reading Actual Innocence, was struck by the “heartbreak-
ing” consequences of placing too much trust in an imperfect system. 20 
“Capital punishment, like the rest of the criminal justice system,” 
Will said, “is a government program, so skepticism is in order.”21 
Also, a Republican governor from Illinois issued the first moratorium 
on executions in recent times.22 
 That there are some conservatives who have begun to submit the 
death penalty to greater scrutiny should come as no surprise. Rather, 
the philosophical underpinnings of conservativism should be seen not 
merely as compatible with, but, instead, as a perfectly logical founda-
tion for, an exacting scrutiny of the state’s ultimate power—to take 
away the lives of its citizens. After all, conservatism is defined 
largely by its cautious approach to government power. As Ronald 
Reagan once remarked: 
                                                                                                                  
 17. See id. at 733-39. 
 18. See Summaries of Recent Poll Findings, supra note 12. 
 19. The terms, skeptical  and skepticism, as used in this Comment, simply refer to a 
“doubting or questioning attitude or state of mind,” rather than the more ambitious, phi-
losophical form of skepticism, which posits that “absolute knowledge is impossible.” THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1630 (4th. ed. 2000), avail-
able at http://www.bartleby.com/61/68/50446800.html. The latter view is not a necessary 
basis for the arguments raised in this Comment. 
 20. George F. Will, Innocent on Death Row, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2000, at A23. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Possley & Mills, supra note 15. 
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[M]an is not free unless government is limited. There’s a clear 
cause and effect . . . that is as neat and predictable as a law of 
physics: As government expands, liberty contracts.23 
Likewise, the preamble to the 2000 Republican Party platform stated 
that “[s]ince the election of 1860, the Republican Party has had a 
special calling—to advance the founding principles of freedom and 
limited government and the dignity and worth of every individual.”24 
While the primary focus of conservative rhetoric is economic regula-
tion,25 the principle of limited government has no less application in 
the realm of criminal justice.26 In fact, because the stakes are so high 
with criminal sanctions—i.e., life and freedom from physical re-
straint—reason seems to compel an even greater level of skepti-
cism.27  
 Often, however, the same officials who rely on the rhetoric of 
skepticism to argue for limited government in some areas (e.g., 
taxes28) remain remarkably confident not just in the effectiveness of 
capital punishment, but of their own perfection as administrators of 
it. 29 While, in Illinois, Governor Ryan’s decisions were predicated in 
large part on his recognition of government fallibility, other tradi-
tionally conservative and purportedly big government-wary states 
like Florida and Texas have faithfully maintained their systems de-
spite glaring indications of imperfection. This Comment ultimately 
argues that states that have yet to submit their systems to scrutiny 
                                                                                                                  
 23. Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 11, 1989), in 2 PUB. PAPERS 
1718, 1721 (1991). 
 24. 2000 Republican Party Platform, Preamble, at http://www.rnc.org/GOPInfo/Plat 
form/2000platform1.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2003). 
 25. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 26. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI, VIII. 
 27. Alfredo Garcia, The Fifth Amendment: A Comprehensive and Historical Approach, 
29 U. TOL. L. REV. 209, 212-13 (1998) (noting that, at the time that the Constitution, and, 
later, the Bill of Rights were ratified, prevailing notions of liberty were principally con-
cerned with freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment). 
 28. During his campaign for President in 2000, George W. Bush remarked that the 
key distinction between himself and Al Gore was that “[h]e trusts the government—I trust 
you.” Steve Chapman, Big Government is Back, BALT. SUN, Mar. 25, 2003, at 19A. The rest 
is history. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-16, 115 Stat. 38. 
 29. For example, the same George W. Bush, who, as noted above, criticized Gore for 
his “trust” of government confidently declared during the last debate of the 2000 campaign 
that: 
 There have been some tough [capital punishment] cases come across my 
desk. Some of the hardest moments since I’ve been the governor of the state of 
Texas is to deal with those cases.  
  But my job is to ask two questions, sir: Is the person guilty of the crime, and 
did the person have full access to the courts of law? And I can tell you, looking at 
you right now, in all cases those answers were affirmative. 
The Presidential Debate, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2000, at A20 (emphasis added). 
382  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:377 
 
have, rather unhealthily, failed to recognize the inherent fallibility of 
governments. In other words, in these states, skepticism is lacking.  
 Part II of this Comment discusses the historical and intellectual 
roots of limited government in the United States. It explores first the 
commitment of the Framers, then that of modern era conservatives, 
to limited government. Part II also discusses, and suggests a means 
for reconciling, inconsistencies in the conservative commitment to 
limited government. Part III then discusses the notion that “death is 
different” as it relates to limited government. Part IV compares two 
very distinct responses, those of Illinois and Florida, to exonerations 
of death row prisoners and their clear suggestion of fallibility in 
these states’ systems of capital punishment. Part V focuses on the 
role of DNA in proving the innocence of persons who otherwise might 
have been executed and how this knowledge has begun to undermine 
public confidence in the death penalty. It also discusses, however, 
how the long-term impact of DNA may be to actually legitimize capi-
tal punishment. Against this background, Part VI urges that a skep-
tical response on the part of states that administer the death penalty 
means that for now, at the very least, moratoria are in order, but fur-
ther argues that, even in the face of perceived certainty, the inher-
ently fallible and highly peculiar institution of capital punishment 
should be abolished. Part VII briefly concludes this Comment. 
II.   THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH: WHEN IN DOUBT, LIMIT 
GOVERNMENT 
 Fundamental to systems of limited government is the assumption 
that, notwithstanding efforts to the contrary, human beings inevita-
bly err.30  It is therefore not only in the very nature of government to 
limit the consequences of human fallibility,31 but a limited govern-
ment takes account of the possibility that, as a human institution, “it 
                                                                                                                  
 30. By err, I mean more than those instances where an individual attempts to achieve 
X but instead accomplishes Y. Rather, I am also referring to those instances where an in-
dividual is committed or is morally obligated to do X but, out of self-interest or some other 
less-than-noble desire, does Y. Thus, when I refer to error, the underlying motivation may 
be something as morally benign as administrative incompetence or as universally con-
demned as racism. In either case, the result constitutes a failure to satisfy some estab-
lished legal or moral norm, and, in that sense, is an error. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 772 (1986) (defining error as “an act or condition of often igno-
rant or imprudent deviation from a code of behavior”). 
 31. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 84 (J. C. A. Gaskin ed., 1996) (1651). In Hobbes’ 
view: 
[I]t is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep 
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, 
as is of every man, against every man. . . .  
. . . In such condition, . . . the life of man[] [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short. 
Id. 
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will itself become the enemy.”32  The Framers of the American Con-
stitution, given their deeply skeptical view of human nature, were 
thus well-poised to fashion what was, and arguably still remains, 
“the best device ever created for limiting government.”33       
 Conversely, the drastic expansion of the federal government since 
the Framing rests on a decidedly more optimistic view of human na-
ture. Programs like the New Deal and the Great Society “endorsed 
government as [a] positive force that ameliorated wrongs and ex-
panded the freedom of the individual.”34  
 The essence of modern era conservatism lies in its opposition to 
such optimism. Like the Framers before them, conservatives are 
deeply skeptical of man’s ability to govern, and thus view big gov-
ernment not as the solution, but as the problem.35 It is this skepti-
cism that provides the framework for this Comment’s analysis. 
A.   The Skeptical Foundations of Limited Government in America  
 The Ancient Hebrews, as a direct consequence of their belief in 
“original sin,”36 were arguably the first to embrace limited govern-
ment by recognizing the legitimacy of only those kings who obeyed 
God’s law (“the Torah”).37 The case of King Nebuchadnezzar is illus-
trative. The King, in looking upon what he considered his kingdom, 
asked: “Is not this the great Babylon I have built as the royal resi-
dence, by my mighty power and for the glory of my majesty?”38 The 
God of the Hebrews responded by rendering the proud King insane 
for seven years,39 sending (as he did to numerous other kings)40 the 
clear message that his rule was subject to a higher authority. Thus, 
for the Hebrews, “[l]aw [was] not merely an expression of will or 
power; it [was] based on transcendent principles. The legislator [was] 
as bound by law as . . . the subject or citizen; no one [was] above the 
                                                                                                                  
 32. Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization o f the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 703, 711 (1984). This particular recognition for the need to limit government is per-
haps best reflected in Lord Acton’s oft-quoted maxim: “Power tends to corrupt and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely.” THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 1 (Angela Partington 
ed., 1992). 
 33. CATO INSTITUTE , CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR THE 106TH CONGRESS 3 (1999). 
 34. CHARLES W. DUNN & J. DAVID WOODWARD, THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION IN 
AMERICA 3 (rev. ed. 2003) (1996). 
 35. See Dinesh D’Souza, Big Government is Still the Problem, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2002, at A21 (quoting Ronald Reagan’s dictum that “Big government is not the solution; 
big government is the problem.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Isaiah  64:4-6; Romans 3:10-18; Ephesians 2:1-3 (English Standard Ver-
sion). 
 37. See 1 S.E. FINER, THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES: 
ANCIENT MONARCHIES AND EMPIRES 238-39 (1997). 
 38. Daniel 4:30 (New International Version) (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 4:32-33. 
 40. See, e.g., 1, 2 Samuel; 1, 2 Kings; 1, 2 Chronicles (New International Version). 
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law.”41 It was an essential framework for man, who, “brought forth in 
iniquity,”42 could not be trusted to govern independent of “the stat-
utes of God and his laws.”43 
 Through the Protestant reformers and, later, the American Puri-
tans, the Hebrew notion of limited government as a necessary conse-
quence of human fallibility was continued.44 In protesting the ex-
cesses of the once-unassailable powers of the Roman Church, Martin 
Luther declared that: 
Unless I am convinced by Scripture and plain reason—I do not ac-
cept the authority of the popes and councils, for they have contra-
dicted each other—my conscience is captive to the Word of God.45  
Calvin similarly believed that government was only legitimate inso-
far as it adhered to the law as set forth in Scripture. If it failed to do 
so, Calvin implored: “[L]et us not pay the least regard to it . . . .”46 It 
was a message that the Puritans seized as they left England for 
America in search of a “City upon a Hill” where they could “‘keep 
[God’s] Commandments and His Ordinances, and His laws, and the 
Articles of [their] Covenant with Him.’”47 Their colonial descendants 
would realize, however, that even an ocean’s distance was not neces-
sarily a guarantee to freedom from a government entrusted with too 
much power.  
 Accordingly, picking up where Luther and Calvin left off, but tak-
ing the concept of limited government a step further, the American 
revolutionaries grew to reject monarchical rule altogether: 
                                                                                                                  
 41. CATO INSTITUTE , CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR THE 108TH CONGRESS 11 (2003) [hereinafter CATO HANDBOOK FOR 108TH CONGRESS]. 
The CATO Institute, a foremost authority in the area of limited government, views limited 
government as an institution that originated among “ancient Hebrews and . . . Greek phi-
losophers” and culminated in the Anglo-American tradition, first with the Magna Carta of 
1215, followed by “the Petition of Right of 1628, the Bill of Rights of 1689, the American 
Declaration of Independence,” and, ultimately, the Bill of Rights in 1789. See id. at 11-12. 
 42. Psalm 51:5 (English Standard Version). 
 43. Exodus 18:16 (English Standard Version). 
 44. The Greco-Roman tradition also figured quite prominently in the development of 
limited government. In particular, it is the Romans to whom we owe “checks and balances” 
as a means of checking government excess. See FINER, supra note 37, at 396. 
 45. A Mighty Fortress for Our God, Luther at the Imperial Diet of Worms (1521), at 
http://www.luther.de/en/worms.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2003). 
 46. 4 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION: THE EXTERNAL MEANS 
OR AIDS BY WHICH GOD INVITES US INTO THE SOCIETY OF CHRIST AND HOLDS US THEREIN § 
32 (Henry Beveridge trans., 1990), available at http://www.bible.org/docs/history 
/calvin/institut/ci400021.htm. In proclaiming Calvin’s importance, one author has declared: 
“‘He that will not honor the memory and respect the influence of Calvin, knows but little of 
the origin of American liberty. He bequeathed to the world a republican spirit in religion, 
with the kindred principles of republican liberty.’” 2 WILLIAM J. JACKMAN, HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN NATION 322 (1911) (quoting GEORGE BANCROFT, LITERARY AND HISTORICAL MIS-
CELLANIES 406-07 (1855)). 
 47. John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity, in THE AMERICAN STUDIES 
ANTHOLOGY 12, 18 (Richard P. Horwitz ed., 2001) (1630) (quoting Deuteronomy  30:16).  
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That the Almighty hath here entered his protest against monar-
chial government is true, or the scripture is false. And a man hath 
good reason to believe that there is as much of kingcraft as priest-
craft in withholding the scripture from the public in Popish coun-
tries. For monarchy in every instance is the Popery of government.48 
And the matter did not end there. Mindful of man’s fallibility, the 
leaders of the new American nation were not merely concerned with 
casting off the yolk of monarchical rule. Rather, more to the point 
was Jefferson’s view, as stated in his A Summary View of the Rights 
of British America, that “history has informed us that bodies of men 
as well as individuals are susceptible of the spirit of tyranny.”49 
 Though it was far more radical than anything that the Protestant 
Reformers likely envisioned, the philosophy that underlay the new 
American nation was much the same—as James Madison wrote:  
[W]hat is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on 
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be nec-
essary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary.50 
Madison and other Founders of the American Republic knew better 
than to view government less than skeptically.51 Thus, within the 
government, the founders instituted a system of “checks and bal-
ances” to ensure that no branch would become too powerful or, ide-
                                                                                                                  
 48. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 76 (Penguin Books 1981) (1776) (emphasis 
added). As an alternative to the fallible rule of monarchies, Paine wrote: “[L]et it be 
brought forth placed on the divine law, the word of God; let a crown be placed thereon, by 
which the world may know, that so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America THE 
LAW IS KING.” Id. at 98. 
 49. CATO HANDBOOK FOR 108TH CONGRESS, supra note 41, at 10 (quoting THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA 9 (1774)). 
 50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 337 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed., 1937). 
 51. Indeed, at least one author has contended that the otherwise enlightened Madison 
was not above the influence of Calvinism and its skepticism: 
Madison’s point of view is doubtless connected with the idea of tolerance as it 
had been developed by Locke and the Anglo -French Enlighte nment. But it also 
contains a trace of biblical influence. American Calvinism retained, against the 
optimism of the European Enlightenment, the consciousness of original sin. 
Madison did not seek to render man good, nor did he count on his goodness. He 
knew man’s corruption and, thus, deployed what I will call the strategy of Ba-
bel. Following the Eternal, who had dispersed men so that they could not unite 
in the project of a fatally bad goal, Madison dispersed citizens into innumerable 
interest groups and religious denominations, in order to render them incapable 
of building the totalitarian city, of persecuting and oppressing one another . . . . 
Since men, because of original sin, see their most sublime enterprises (and es-
pecially those) turn to disaster and to crime, let us divide them so that they will 
only be capable of partial and localized evils.  
Alain Besançon, The Church Embraces Democracy, CRISIS, Sept. 1995, at 32, 34.  Madison 
likely found influence in John Witherspoon, a Presbyterian minister, who directed Madi-
son’s graduate program at the College of New Jersey. See James H. Smylie, Madison and 
Witherspoon: Theological Roots of American Political Thought, 22 PRINCETON. U. LIBR. 
CHRON. 118, 118-32 (1961). 
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ally, more powerful than any other.52 Likewise, state governments 
and the federal government were intended to function as checks on 
each other.53 And, government officials would be, through popular 
elections, subject to the will of political majorities. 54  
 None of these checks were necessarily effective, however, in check-
ing the government’s greatest exercise of power: taking away the “life 
or liberty”55 of an individual, primarily through administration of 
criminal justice. Here, the Bill of Rights, “in order to prevent [the 
government’s] misconstruction or abuse of its powers”56 where its ex-
ercise thereof is greatest, recognized individual rights independent of 
the government.57 
 The Framers, ever conscious of human fallibility, thus instituted a 
system of government designed “to leave open for transgressors no 
door which they could possibly shut.”58 Since the Framing, however, 
                                                                                                                  
 52. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Beard Thesis and Franklin Roosevelt, 56 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 114, 118-19 (1987). Sunstein states:  
[T]he Framers did not believe that a system of deliberative representation was suffi-
cient in itself. The system of checks and balances was designed to serve a variety of 
supplemental functions, providing safeguards in the event of a breakdown in repre-
sentative processes. That system would, for example, furnish a measure of prote ction 
against factionalism; some groups might be able to usurp the power of one branch, 
but they would be unlikely to obtain power over all three. 
Id. 
 53. See id. at 117, 119. 
  Three basic commitments underlay the original constitutional design. The first 
was to some form of ‘limited government,’ . . . the second was to a system of checks 
and balances[,] . . . [and] the third was to federalism . . . .  
  . . . . 
  The federal system provided an additional set of safeguards[,] . . . a kind of verti-
cal separation of powers, protecting private rights . . . . 
Id. 
 54. See Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of 
Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 245 (1997) (explaining that “democracy is a form of lim-
ited government” because it “requires that political officials observe limits on their behav-
ior[,]” including “abiding by election results”). 
 55. While the inalienability of property rights has been the subject of some debate, 
“life and liberty,” included within both the Lockean and Jeffersonian constructions of natu-
ral rights, have not. See, e.g., Herman Schwartz, Property Rights and the Constitution: Will 
the Ugly Duckling Become a Swan?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 9 (1987); Douglas G. Smith, Natural 
Law, Article IV, and Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 351 
(1997). 
 56. U.S. CONST. pmbl. to amends. I-X. 
 57. See Donald Elfenbein, The Myth of Conservatism as a Constitutional Philosophy, 
71 IOWA L. REV. 401, 407 (1986) (contending that the Bill of Rights embodies an “‘individu-
alist theory of natural rights’”) (quoting Morris R. Cohen, The Bill of Rights Theory, in LAW 
AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 148, 149 (1933)). 
 58. 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 299 (2d ed. rev. 1889). In an 
analysis, much like that laid out in this section, Bryce observed: 
Some one has said that the American Government and Constitution are based on the 
theology of Calvin and the philosophy of Hobbes. This is at least true, that there is a 
hearty Puritanism in the view of human nature which pervades the instrument of 
1787. It is the work of men who believed in original sin, and were resolved to leave 
open for transgressors no door which they could possibly shut. Compare this spirit 
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decidedly less skeptical views of human nature have prevailed in 
American governance. It is this departure from the Framers’ skepti-
cism to which the emergence of modern era conservatism owes its in-
spiration.      
B.   The Conservative Crusade and Its (Limited) Rhetoric of Limited 
Government 
 One account of American history since the Framing provides that: 
 By the close of the nineteenth-century, government was looked 
on more and more as a redemptive force to do good for society . . . . 
[T]he lessons of the Framers about government were forgotten . . . .  
  . . . .  
 . . . [The views of the Progressive Reformers] represented a fun-
damental change in the understanding of human nature. Far from 
being suspicious of concentrated government power, Progressives 
saw concentrated government power as an important lever to en-
act social and economic change . . . .  
  . . . .  
 . . . The New Deal can be seen . . . as the culmination of this view 
of human nature . . . .59  
Such optimism continued to predominate during the 1960s as the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations “raised hopes that poverty, 
racism, and chronic unemployment . . . would disappear through lib-
eral legislation . . . .”60 The cumulative impact of these efforts was a 
massive expansion in the size and authority of the federal govern-
ment, a result clearly inconsistent with “the Founding notion that 
the national government had limited powers over economic and so-
cial development.” 61  
 Failed liberal policies during the 1960s and 1970s, however, in-
spired a “conservative renaissance,” which offered Americans an “al-
ternative vision” of government.62 Under this vision, big government 
was not the solution to the nation’s problems; rather, it was the prob-
lem. 63 Like the Framers before them, the conservatives’ adherence to 
the principle of limited governent was grounded in their understand-
                                                                                                                  
with the enthusiastic optimism of the Frenchmen of 1789. It is not merely a differ-
ence of race temperaments; it is a difference of fundamental ideas. 
Id. 
 59. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Nature of the State and the State of Nature: A Comment 
on Grady & McGuire’s Paper, 1 J. BIOECONOMICS  241, 254-56 (1999). 
 60. DUNN & WOODWARD, supra note 34, at 2. 
 61. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE : FOUNDATIONS 105 (1991). 
 62. DUNN & WOODWARD, supra note 34, at 2-3. 
 63. See D’Souza, supra note 35, at A21. 
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ing of human nature. As the authors of The Conservative Tradition in 
America explain:  
The conservative view . . . is centered around the Biblical doctrine 
of ‘original sin’—the idea that man is morally flawed and imper-
fectible. . . . [And] although some conservatives base this belief on 
the biblical account of the fall of man, such a belief is not a neces-
sary condition for a conservative’s distrust of human nature. A 
conservative may distrust human nature because he does not trust 
man’s ability to hold to moral values or to govern without making 
serious mistakes.64  
 In a speech he gave on behalf of the Goldwater campaign in 1964, 
Ronald Reagan warned that: 
‘[T]he full power of centralized government’ . . . was the very thing the 
Founding Fathers sought to minimize. They knew that governments 
don’t control things. A government can’t control the economy without 
controlling people. And they know when a government sets out to do 
that, it must use force and coercion to achieve its purpose.65 
Such skepticism was at the heart of Reagan’s Revolution sixteen 
years later66 and continues to be a dominant thread in mainstream 
conservatism today.67 
 From Reagan onward, the most common prescription for what ails 
the conservative are tax reductions designed “to starve politicians of 
the resources with which they would regulate the economy, pursue 
their favorite projects, redistribute wealth, and reward clients who 
kept them in office.”68 The practical limits of conservative skepticism 
do not, however, extend much further. That is, while conservatives 
assume a dismal view of human nature as it pertains to the govern-
ment’s ability to regulate the economy, they remain confident of its 
competence in other areas. Most inconsistent, perhaps, is the conser-
vative’s faith in the government’s ability to administer criminal jus-
tice. With regard to the Fourth Amendment, for instance, one author 
points out that: 
[Though][t]he label ‘conservative’ can be associated with theories 
espousing limited government[,] . . . [i]n the contemporary fourth 
                                                                                                                  
 64. DUNN & WOODWARD, supra note 34, at 53. 
 65. Ronald Reagan, Rendezvous with Destiny, Address on Behalf of Senator Barry 
Goldwater (Oct. 27, 1964), available at www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan/speeches/ren 
dezvous.asp. 
 66. See John R. Kasich, Rekindling Reagan’s Revolution, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1994, 
at A19 (“The president’s message was straightforward—government is the problem, not 
the solution. To correct the problem, Mr. Reagan offered four common sense proposals: tax 
cuts, sound monetary policy to reduce inflation, spending restraint and deregulation.”). 
 67. See E.J. Dionne, Jr., Conservatism Recast: Why this President’s Reach Could Be 
Monumental, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at B1. 
 68. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A 
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 17 (1991). 
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amendment context, . . . the term ‘conservative’ is more likely to be 
linked with those favoring expansive executive branch authority to 
search and seize and ‘liberal’ with those favoring individual lib-
erty.69 
 This Comment seeks to resolve this inconsistency where it mat-
ters most: in the context of the death penalty. Here, the “Due Process 
Model” of criminal justice provides a useful starting point to bridge 
the gaps in conservative skepticism. 
C.   The Due Process Model  
 Like conservatism, the “Due Process Model” of criminal justice 
proceeds from the basic observation that humans are fallible: 
[P]eople are notoriously poor observers of disturbing events—the 
more emotion-arousing the context, the greater the possibility that 
recollection will be incorrect; confessions and admissions by per-
sons in police custody may be induced by physical or psychological 
coercion, so that the police end up hearing what the suspect thinks 
they want to hear rather than the truth; witnesses may be ani-
mated by a bias or interest that no one would trouble to discover 
except one specially charged with protecting the interests of the 
accused—which the police are not.70 
Thus, “informal factfinding processes” are not sufficient to defini-
tively establish “factual guilt,”71 because these processes, as with all 
things human, err.72 Instead, under the “Due Process Model,” not 
only is there an “insistence on formal, adjudicative, adversary, fact-
finding processes [and] . . . full opportunity [for the accused] to dis-
credit the case against him,” but in recognizing human fallibility, 
even these processes are subject to “further scrutiny” through the 
appeals process. 73 While, to some extent, adherence to the “Due Proc-
ess Model” of justice has diminished in recent times, 74 due process 
remains an essential component of our limited form of government; 
and even the weakest due process is, fundamentally, a recognition 
that governments make mistakes. 75  
 The standard, under even the most demanding due process, is not, 
of course, to restrain governmental action absent certainty. This is 
                                                                                                                  
 69. Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment 
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 206 n.15 (1993). 
 70. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 
(1964). The alternative to the “Due Process Model,” according to Packer, is the “Crime Con-
trol Model.” See id. at 6. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 468 (1971) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 73. See Packer, supra note 70, at 14. 
 74. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
 75. See Packer, supra note 70, at 14. 
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neither practical nor possible. A society such as this one could not 
possibly function unless it was free to make informed, rational judg-
ments at the risk of error. Accordingly, in criminal justice, the stan-
dard for guilt is not “beyond any doubt” but, rather, “beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.”76 One can easily imagine that the former standard 
would result in a high rate of release for the guilty and, conse-
quently, further infliction of suffering upon the innocent. The stan-
dard, then, is one of near, but not absolute, certainty. Implicit in this 
compromise is this society’s need for criminal justice-by-government, 
coupled with an obligation on the part of government to proceed 
within carefully delineated boundaries. 
 Yet where limitations are generally necessary in governmental 
administration of criminal justice, they are particularly relevant 
where, rather than loss of liberty or other lesser criminal sanctions 
are threatened, the right to life itself is at issue. The next part briefly 
discusses the relevance of the notion, “death is different,” as it relates 
to the fallibility of governments. 
III.   “DEATH IS DIFFERENT”: GUARDING AGAINST HUMAN FALLIBILITY 
WHERE LIFE IS AT STAKE 
 One question that arises in response to the charge of human falli-
bility in administration of the death penalty proceeds something like: 
“Are not all human choices, . . . and most relevantly, all choices re-
garding criminal punishment, vulnerable to . . . [the] same objec-
tion[]?”77 To this, there exists another simple yet nonetheless compel-
ling response: “Death is different.”78 As Justice Brennan wrote: 
“Death is a unique punishment[,] . . . an unusually severe punish-
ment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity.”79 Put 
simply, the stakes are extraordinarily high in capital punishment, 
higher perhaps than with any other consequence of government ac-
tion. 
 One response to death’s uniqueness is a call for heightened vigi-
lance where a sentence of death is being adjudicated. This may be 
thought of as a sort of “super-due process,” described by Charles 
Black as flowing from the concept of “death is different”: 
                                                                                                                  
 76. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1969). 
 77. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE 
AND MISTAKE 29 (2d ed. 1981). 
 78. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 292-98 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“[D]eath is different in kind from any other punishment imposed 
under our system of criminal justice . . . [and it cannot] be imposed under sentencing pro-
cedures that create[] a substantial risk that it [will] be inflicted in an arbitrary and capri-
cious manner.”). 
 79. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-87 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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[D]eath is different . . . [thus] the infliction of death by official 
choice ought to require a higher degree of clarity and precision in 
the governing standards than we can practicably require of all 
choices, even of choices for punishment.80 
 Yet, while administrators of the death penalty might take special 
care to avoid error, this, of course, does not mean that they will not 
err. Even assuming a reduction in frequency of error, the question 
remains whether death’s “uniqueness” is appropriately taken into ac-
count simply by shoring up procedural safeguards. In capital pun-
ishment, the consequence of even the most occasional error is excep-
tional both in the degree of its injustice as well as its irreversibility. 
The next part of this Comment compares the responses of Florida 
and Illinois to this dilemma. 
IV.   A TALE OF TWO STATES: THE RESPONSES OF ILLINOIS AND 
FLORIDA TO FAILED JUSTICE 
 Thus far, this Comment has put forth the theoretical case for 
viewing the institution of capital punishment skeptically. We need 
not merely hypothesize, however, about the tragedy that can ensue 
from granting fallible governments the power to impose the death 
penalty. Rather, the exonerations of those who have been wrongfully 
convicted and sentenced to death tell us that, at the very least, the 
system of capital punishment can come dangerously close to taking 
innocent life.81 Among those politically entrusted with carrying out 
the death penalty, there appears to be a consensus on the importance 
of avoiding such a fateful error. Where the disagreement lies instead 
is in whether the humans responsible for administering the system 
can be completely confident in their ability to do so. This disagree-
ment is highlighted by the very different responses of Governor Ryan 
and Governor Bush to indications of imperfection in their states’ sys-
tems of capital punishment. 
                                                                                                                  
 80. BLACK, supra note 77, at 29-30. 
 81. That is, if it hasn’t happened already. See Anne-Marie Moyes, Note, Assessing the 
Risk of Executing the Innocent: A Case for Allowing Access to Physical Evidence for Post-
humous DNA Testing, 55 VAND. L. REV. 953 (2002) (discussing the opposition of states to 
testing DNA evidence in cases of individuals already executed). In one case, the State of 
Virginia “‘vehemently opposed’” posthumous DNA testing for fear that “‘it . . . would be 
shouted from the rooftops that the Commonwealth of Virginia executed an innocent man.’” 
Id. at 956-57 (quoting Petition for Appeal at 9 n.6, Roman Catholic Diocese v. Fruit (Va. 
1999) (No. 99-1834); Record of Hearing Before Circuit Court Judge Edward Hanson, Jr. 
(June 15, 1998), at 82, Roman Catholic Diocese v. Fruit (Va. Cir. Ct. of Va. Beach 1998) 
(No. CL 98-122)). 
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A.   Illinois: A System “Fraught with Error”82 
 In 1982, Anthony Porter was convicted of two murders and sen-
tenced to death.83 Sixteen years later, he exhausted his last standard 
appeal.84 It appeared that time, so far as the legal system was con-
cerned, was the only thing left to be dispensed with before Anthony 
Porter’s execution.85 For Porter, that meant fifty hours—his suit had 
already been pressed, his coffin sized, his last meal ordered.86 Then, 
the Illinois Supreme Court granted Porter a reprieve, not because it 
doubted his guilt, but because it doubted his intelligence.87 In the 
frequently bizarre world of capital punishment, there remained a 
question of whether Porter was intelligent enough to comprehend his 
impending death.88 Enter Professor Protess and a team of North-
western journalism students. 89 Hiring a private investigator, Protess 
and his students sought to establish that Porter was undeserving of 
the death penalty, not due to his lack of intelligence, but, rather, due 
to his innocence. In less than a year, a group of outsiders did what, in 
seventeen years, the law failed to do: free an innocent man con-
demned to die.90  
 Porter’s case marked the twelfth time since Illinois resumed exe-
cutions in 1977 that a death row inmate was exonerated.91 One exon-
eration later, Illinois earned the distinction of exonerating more peo-
ple in its capital punishment system than it executed.92 For the gov-
ernor and many others, the time had come for skepticism. 93 
 On January 31, 2000, Governor George Ryan announced a mora-
torium on all executions in Illinois, pending a closer examination of 
his state’s system of capital punishment. 94 At its core, Governor 
Ryan’s decision reflected a coming to terms with the fallibility of a 
                                                                                                                  
 82. Press Release, Governor George H. Ryan, Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on 
Executions, Will Appoint Commission to Review Capital Punishment System (Jan. 31, 
2000) [hereinafter Moratorium Press Release], at http://www.state.il.us/gov/press 
/00/Jan/morat.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2003). 
 83.  Norman L. Greene, Governor George H. Ryan, Donald Cabana, Jim Dwyer, Mar-
tha Barnett & Evan Davis, Governor Ryan’s Capital Punishment Moratorium and the Exe-
cutioner’s Confession: Views from the Governor’s Mansion to Death Row, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 401, 408 (2001). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Fatal Flaws of Capital Punishment, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1999, at N26; Slater, su-
pra note 13, at A56. 
 87. Greene et al., supra note 83, at 408. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 409. 
 91. Aaron Chambers, Warm Statewide Reception for High Court’s Capital-Case Rule 
Changes, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 23, 2001, at 1. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Moratorium Press Release, supra note 82. 
 94. Id. 
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system for which he was ultimately responsible. In commenting on 
the exonerations, Ryan remarked: 
I cannot support a system, which, in its administration, has proven 
to be so fraught with error and has come so close to the ultimate 
nightmare, the state’s taking of innocent life.95 
As to what it would take for Ryan to resume executions, he was very 
clear: 
 Until I can be sure that everyone sentenced to death in Illinois is 
truly guilty, until I can be sure with moral certainty that no inno-
cent man or woman is facing a lethal injection, no one will meet 
that fate.96 
 For the time being, then, Ryan asked himself whether he could 
“prevent another Anthony Porter—another innocent man or woman 
from paying the ultimate penalty for a crime he or she did not com-
mit?”97 His answer was clearly that he could not (“Today, I cannot 
answer that question”).98 Still unanswered to that point, though, was 
the question: Did Ryan really believe that he could ever achieve a de-
gree of “moral certainty” that would satisfy him enough to resume 
his state’s system of executions? The answer to that question argua-
bly came a little less than three years later when Ryan commuted 
the sentences of every death row prisoner in the state of Illinois to 
life.99 Like Justice Blackmun nearly a decade earlier, Ryan declared 
that he would never again “tinker with the machinery of death.”100 
His rationale, once again, turned on the notion of human fallibility: 
  Our capital system is haunted by the demon of error—error in 
determining guilt, and error in determining who among the guilty 
deserves to die. Because of all of these reasons today I am commut-
ing the sentences of all death row inmates.101 
 As a theoretical matter, Ryan hinted that capital punishment 
might, in fact, be a deserving punishment for some.102 However, as a 
practical matter, he had seen enough. While reform might have been 
Ryan’s initial goal, scrutiny of the system revealed far more problems 
                                                                                                                  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Governor Explains Why He Commuted Death Sentences, CHI. DAILY HERALD, 
Jan. 12, 2003, at 2 [hereinafter Governor Explains]. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. (“If I did not take this action, I feared that there would be no comprehen-
sive and thorough inquiry into the guilt of the individuals on death row or of the fairness of 
the sentences applied.”). This statement may suggest that, had Ryan been confident that 
such an inquiry would have been conducted, he may not have been so inclined to grant the 
blanket commutation. 
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than answers.103 Cognizant of his own fallibility and that of others 
responsible for the system, the conservative governor could not, as a 
matter of conscience, entrust an inefficient system with matters of 
life and death.104  
B.   Florida: An “Extraordinary” System 
 While much attention has focused on Illinois, its seventeen exon-
erations are but a distant second to the twenty-three death row pris-
oners Florida has exonerated since 1973.105 The case of the latest 
such prisoner to be exonerated, Rudolph Holton, is illustrative of 
Florida’s administration of, and more importantly for this Comment, 
its response to flaws in, its system of capital punishment. 
 The case against Rudolph Holton was a fairly typical one. A white 
witness testified against a black defendant who, according to the 
witness, resembled the murderer in very racially or ethnically pecu-
liar ways—in Holton’s case, the witness testified that Holton, like the 
murderer, was a black man with “frizzy hair” and “shaving 
bumps.”106 The key witness for the prosecution was a jailhouse infor-
mant.107 The judge was especially fond of the death penalty, so much 
so that he proudly bore the nickname “Hanging Harry.”108 The de-
fense lawyer was court-appointed and the case was one of several 
that she was trying to manage at the time.109 The jury was all 
white.110 The prosecutor was willing to test the boundaries of the ad-
versarial system. 111 And then, of course, there was the defendant: a 
poor, black drug addict. 112 
 In his closing statement, the prosecutor, arguing the reliability of 
a black jailhouse informant, implored: “Ladies and gentleman . . . 
this is a horrible crime that even a fellow black inmate will not toler-
ate.”113 Regarding the prosecution’s key piece of evidence—an Afri-
can-American pubic hair in the victim’s mouth—the prosecutor em-
                                                                                                                  
 103. Id. (“The facts I have seen raised questions not only about the innocence of people 
on death row, but about the fairness of the death penalty system as a whole.”). 
 104. See id. 
 105. Death Penalty Information Center, Exonerations by State, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=412&scid=6#state (last visited Dec. 6, 
2003) [hereinafter Exonerations by State]. 
 106. Answer Brief of Appellee at 15, State v. Holton (Fla. Aug. 1, 2002) (No. SC01-
2671), at http://www.wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/briefs/01-2671_ans.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 
2003). 
 107. David Karp, The Innocence Defense (pt. 1), ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, 
at 22A [hereinafter Karp pt. 1]. 
 108. Id. 
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 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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phasized that, because Holton was an African-American, he could not 
be excluded.114 He dismissed the probability that the hair was the 
victim’s since she, too, was an African-American: “I would just defy 
anybody to tell me how those are her hairs, how she got them.”115 Due 
to the work of an underpaid yet dedicated lawyer and a state agency 
that is presently on the brink of extinction, the confident prosecutor 
would soon be defied.116  
 Beginning in 1996, Linda McDermott, a lawyer with Capital Col-
lateral Representative (CCR), Florida’s state-funded agency respon-
sible for post-conviction capital appeals, set out to prove Rudolph 
Holton’s innocence.117 On little more than $30,000 a year, McDermott 
determined to go the extra mile on Holton’s case.118 Her Tampa su-
pervisor, however, was not so willing to accommodate. To him, 
McDermott’s extra mile was simply a euphemism for “wasting tax 
dollars.”119 Accordingly, he established new rules for CCR in which 
interviews with witnesses had to be conducted by telephone and se-
vere restrictions were placed on overtime.120 The new rules prompted 
McDermott to resign from CCR only to return to its seemingly more 
committed Tallahassee office.121 Her return proved to be a fortuitous 
one for Holton.122 
 After meeting with Barry Scheck in 1998, McDermott determined 
that new DNA technology was the key to Holton’s case—it would de-
termine whether the state’s key evidence, the pubic hair, did, in fact, 
belong to Rudolph Holton.123 It, she soon discovered, did not. 124 Not 
long after this revelation, the state’s jailhouse informant retracted 
his testimony—referring to Holton, the informant explained: “I set 
him up.”125 Then, it was discovered that the victim had, ten days ear-
lier, accused someone other than Rudolph Holton of raping her—a 
fact that was never raised at trial. 126 The case against Rudolph Hol-
ton had been completely debunked. 
 Holton’s exoneration marked Florida’s 23rd and the nation’s 111th 
since executions resumed in 1973.127 Florida, by far, leads the country 
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in exonerations of death penalty prisoners.128 This, however, can be 
and has been looked at in very different ways. From the reformist—
or skeptical—perspective, twenty-three exonerations reflects a 
flawed system. To others, the exonerations are an indication that the 
system is working.  
 After Holton’s exoneration, Florida’s governor, Jeb Bush, was 
asked about the need for a comprehensive review of its system, simi-
lar to that conducted in Illinois. Bush replied: “I don’t think it’s nec-
essary for our state . . . . We have a criminal justice system that pro-
tects the rights of these folks [death penalty inmates like Rudolph 
Holton] in an extraordinary way and continues to do so.”129 Confident 
that all the people for whom he has signed death warrants were “de-
serving” of the death penalty, Bush instead asserted that that the 
real problem is the slow pace of Florida’s death machinery.130 Addi-
tionally, the cost of capital punishment—at least the cost of post-
conviction defense for people like Rudolph Holton—is something 
Bush has sought to change.131 Ironically, citing budget concerns, 
Bush has proposed a phase-out of the very agency (CCR) that was re-
sponsible for “protecting the rights of . . . folks” like Rudolph Holton 
in “an extraordinary way” by proving their innocence—thus saving 
their lives—through post-conviction representation.132 
 Essentially, Bush and other relevant political and judicial actors 
in Florida have refused to recognize the fallibility of Florida’s system 
and their roles within it. It is an especially peculiar position for Bush 
who, for instance, has prided himself on a tax policy which he claims 
functions as “liberation from the slavery of big, bloated govern-
ment.”133 After all, the same “big, bloated government” that arguably 
threatens to enslave the taxpayer was perhaps summed up best by 
Tom Feeney, former Speaker of the Florida House of Representa-
tives, political ally of Governor Bush, and ardent supporter of capital 
punishment: 
[M]ake no mistake about it: One of the dangers of big government 
is that the largest atrocities in human history, from the execution 
of Christ to the Nazi holocaust of Jews and others they considered 
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undesirable, have been perpetrated and organized by big govern-
ment.134  
Indeed, while paying taxes to an excessively large, inefficient gov-
ernment certainly has its problems, the greatest danger of “big gov-
ernment,” as Feeney suggests, has been in its power to determine 
who is entitled to life and who is not.  
 Unlike Governor Ryan, however, neither Bush nor Florida’s Re-
publican-controlled house or senate have so much as conceded that 
Florida’s death penalty system is less than perfect, much less recog-
nized a need for reform. Questions that have yet to be submitted to 
serious scrutiny are: What if Linda McDermott had not gone the ex-
tra mile? What if there was no agency, as may soon be the case, to 
employ someone like McDermott who has the institutional knowl-
edge and dedication to provide effective post-conviction assistance? 
What if a frustrated and hopeless Rudolph Holton’s request to have 
his death warrant signed in 1996 was granted?135 What if, as was the 
case with another death row inmate who was eventually cleared,136 
Rudolph Holton had died while waiting for someone to prove his in-
nocence? What if the jailhouse snitch had not retracted his state-
ment? What if the DNA evidence leading to Holton’s exoneration was 
mishandled or misplaced so as not to allow for its testing? The “what 
if?” game is not a purely conjectural one—in many cases, the se-
quence of events may be such that, unlike the Holton investigation, 
chance disfavors the discovery of truth and instead confirms other-
wise tenuous legal conclusions. 137 Moreover, one should not forget 
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that, despite his eventual exoneration, Rudolph Holton spent sixteen 
years of his life condemned to die for a crime he did not commit.  
 The point here is that Governor Bush does not, anymore than 
Governor Ryan, have any real basis to claim as a matter of absolute 
certainty that “every death warrant” he has signed has, in fact, led to 
the death of “deserving” persons. 138 At best, he might say that the 
evidence was overwhelming, that, after careful consideration, he 
could not reasonably consider those for whom he signed death war-
rants as anything but guilty.  
 Even then, though, the question becomes whether this level of cer-
tainty should suffice. It is essentially a moral inquiry, the answer to 
which relies principally on one’s individual valuation of life. Oddly 
enough, under this equation, it is conservatives, the very people who 
have traditionally been most supportive of the death penalty, who 
perhaps should be most skeptical of its use.  
 In the case of Governor Bush, for instance, he, like many other 
conservatives, proudly professes his respect for life as critical to his 
personal as well as his political makeup. For example, in comment-
ing on the bill he signed to clear the way for Florida license plates 
bearing the anti-abortion message, “Choose Life,” Bush flatly de-
clared, “I believe taking an innocent life is wrong.”139 Thus, Bush 
clearly espouses the view that life—at least innocent life—is sacred, 
and that, therefore, it should not be taken away. Its implications for 
the abortion debate aside, Bush’s statement is hardly a controversial 
one. It is with regard to the “guilty,” instead, that many reasonable 
people disagree about the morality of taking a life. It is not enough, 
however, for Bush and others to defend their position regarding capi-
tal punishment on grounds that it only involves the killing of guilty 
persons. This is unless (as he suggests) in every case, Bush is abso-
lutely certain (beyond any doubt) that the death warrants he signs 
are for the “deserving.”140 This implies not only his own infallibility 
but, to a large extent, that of every other human being—prosecutors, 
witnesses, police officers, defense attorneys, trial judges, appellate 
judges, etc.—who is in some way responsible for the rendering and 
review of death sentences. For someone who, as already noted, read-
ily voices his skepticism of government, certainty as to any bureau-
cratic or judicial decision is a profoundly peculiar position. That this 
position of absolute certainty pertains to what is arguably the gov-
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ernment’s greatest power141—where one would instead expect a 
heightened degree of skepticism—is all the more perplexing. 
 Rudolph Holton escaped Florida’s “machinery of death.” How 
much of this was due to chance and how much was due to the effec-
tiveness of a system that originally condemned him is not something 
that is conducive to precise calculation. However, so long as it is at 
least conceivable that chance, rather than systemic perfection, was 
the major factor in his exoneration, it seems that the system should 
undergo the same type of scrutiny that took place in Illinois under 
Governor Ryan. As Linda McDermott modestly remarked following 
Rudolph Holton’s release, Holton’s case should at the very least serve 
as “an important step to meaningfully review the process” of capital 
punishment in Florida.142 An important part of any such review 
should be an assessment of the role DNA has played and can con-
tinue to play in capital punishment systems or, alternatively, 
whether the emergence of DNA technology has changed the land-
scape of capital punishment in some more fundamental way. The 
next part addresses these issues. 
V.   THE ROLE OF DNA IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A SKEPTICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
A.   The Past: In the Beginning, There Was “Junk Science” 
 Part of the case against Rudolph Holton hinged on a single hair—
expert testimony determined the hair to be that of an African-
American, and since Holton was an African-American, he could not 
be excluded.143 The prosecutor, as earlier noted, made much of this 
fact. That this evidence merely meant Holton was one of over thirty 
million African-Americans144 included in the category of people who 
matched the hair was, apparently, a point ultimately lost on the jury. 
This, as was later confirmed, was an outrageously tenuous basis for 
condemning a man to death. It was, however, by no means an 
anomalous one.  
 Hair evidence dates back to the middle part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, and has since been manipulated by experts and clever prosecu-
tors to prosecute scores of innocent defendants.145 Part of the problem 
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is that hair evidence is generally unreliable. In the 1970s, the U.S. 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) tested the pro-
ficiency of hair analysis in criminal trials. 146 The results revealed er-
ror rates of 27.6 percent to 67.8 percent.147 Moreover, there was very 
little consistency in results among different labs.148 As the authors of 
Actual Innocence declare, “[i]f DNA technology is at one end of the 
spectrum . . . then hair evidence is at the other end.”149 Still, in cases 
like Holton’s, experts and prosecutors continue to frame hair evi-
dence in ways that suggest a probativeness that far exceeds its ac-
tual relevance.  
 Hair evidence, moreover, has merely been one of several pseudo-
scientific tools that state experts have used to convict innocent per-
sons. In Florida, for instance, “superdog” sniffing was used to secure 
the capital conviction of Juan Ramos.150 Not to be outdone, though, 
Mississippi employed the services of an expert whose principal tools 
were a blue laser and yellow goggles.151 Even fingerprinting, while 
certainly more reliable than hair evidence and its curious counter-
parts, has frequently been misinterpreted, misused, and, at times, 
even manipulated to the detriment of numerous innocent defen-
dants.152 In short, while there may be much in the way of positive 
commentary to make on the historical role of science in criminal jus-
tice, it suffices to say, for now, that science—particularly junk sci-
ence—has often been used as a means to artificially legitimate oth-
erwise tenuous evidence. In some cases, this incompetence—or 
worse, corruption—has been the basis for convicting innocent indi-
viduals and even condemning some of them to death. 
B.   The Present: The Emergence of DNA Technology and Its 
Implications for Capital Punishment 
 One author writing in response to the role of DNA in the debate 
over capital punishment has asked “What’s DNA got to do with it?” 153 
After all, of the hundred or so exonerations of death row inmates 
since 1973, only ten percent required DNA testing.154 In answering 
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this question, the author puts forth two basic reasons why DNA has 
a good deal to do with the death penalty debate. First, he argues, 
DNA testing can provide “seemingly conclusive proof of innocence.”155 
Its impact is powerful, and its results are virtually immune to de-
bate. This is much unlike the more or less mythical conception of the 
exonerated death row inmate who “got off” on some “procedural tech-
nicality.” Innocence backed by science is something capital punish-
ment apologists are virtually defenseless to contest.  
 The second reason relates to the contrast between a seemingly in-
fallible science, in the case of DNA, and a fallible human apparatus 
(i.e., the criminal justice system). When DNA exonerates, the percep-
tion, rightly or wrongly, is one in which science, invulnerable to er-
ror, trumps the decisions of error-prone human beings. Unlike the 
many other cases where one group of human beings (e.g., appellate 
judges) overrule the decisions of another group of human beings (e.g., 
trial judges, juries, etc.), DNA exonerations are cloaked in scientific 
certainty. The net effect is that DNA functions to remind us of our 
“inherent fallibility and corruption” as humans, and how our “insti-
tutions” (e.g., criminal justice courts) cannot help but reflect these 
traits. 156 Perhaps, it is for this reason that process, at least as it re-
lates to DNA, has been elevated in death penalty-friendly states like 
Texas and Florida.157 Even in these states, where confidence in swift 
and severe criminal justice seems to reign supreme, the science of 
DNA is nevertheless afforded deference.158 In these and other states, 
prisoners, capital and otherwise (depending on the state), now have a 
limited right to petition the courts to test relevant DNA evidence.159 
 These laws, to some degree, mitigate the diminution in due proc-
ess that has increasingly characterized capital litigation in recent 
years.160 There are, however, some fairly evident and not-so-evident 
limitations worth noting. First, and most obviously, DNA statutes 
only have applicability where there is DNA evidence to test. Thus, 
had a jury convicted Rudolph Holton without relying on physical evi-
dence but had instead based their verdict on eyewitness testimony or 
a coerced confession, DNA testing would not have been of any use. 
Likewise, DNA testing would have been of no value had the state lost 
the hair or otherwise tampered with it so that it could not be tested. 
These variations on the facts of Holton’s case are not only plausible—
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they are actually very much reflective of barriers that have been 
faced by other capital litigants.161  
 A less obvious problem is that, in some states (e.g., Florida), al-
though a statutory right to DNA testing is conferred, it must be exer-
cised according to a prescribed set of criteria.162 That is, the process 
maintains an adversarial nature, which means, in essence, that a 
prisoner’s petition for DNA testing can be denied in the absence of a 
showing of cause for the testing. While arguments have been made 
for a more absolute right, namely a constitutional right inhering un-
der the Due Process Clause,163 courts have not been receptive.164 
Ironically then, as it now stands in states like Florida, DNA testing, 
though it is now much more readily available, is ultimately left to the 
discretion of systems whose fallibility has been demonstrated, in 
large part, through DNA testing.165 
C.   The Future: Can DNA Reconstruct What It Has Deconstructed? 
 This Comment has thus far discussed the role DNA has played in 
undermining the credibility of capital punishment. This trend will 
likely continue as DNA technology becomes more accessible to capital 
prisoners. However, as some commentators have suggested, the long-
term impact of DNA actually might be to legitimate capital punish-
ment.166  
 Ricky Nolen McGinn was convicted by the state of Texas for rap-
ing and killing his step-daughter.167 As his execution date ap-
proached, his lawyers pushed to have critical evidence submitted to 
DNA testing.168 The state consented, but unlike the case of Rudolph 
Holton, DNA evidence indicated that McGinn was, in fact, guilty.169 
The state proceeded with his execution. An editorial that followed de-
clared: 
Death penalty opponents have worked hard to undermine that 
public confidence [in the accuracy of death penalty decisions]. To 
hear some of them talk, you’d think everybody on death row was 
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innocent. There is absolutely no reason to think such a thing. DNA 
testing has the potential to counter that impression.170  
 Indeed, DNA has and will surely continue to indicate guilt in 
many cases, both at trial and during the post-conviction process. 
While DNA will probably also continue to exonerate the innocent, 
this may become less and less likely as DNA testing is increasingly 
utilized at trial. First, when DNA testing is performed at trial, this 
provides convictions with the same cloak of scientific certainty that 
exonerations enjoy. For those convicted on the basis of DNA evi-
dence, there seems little if any hope that testing would have utility 
in the post-conviction process. Second, testing at trial should, theo-
retically, now keep people like Rudolph Holton from ever being 
wrongfully convicted in the first place. Further, as the system be-
comes more effective at the front-end, DNA testing might also help to 
legitimize the system even as it exposes its flaws. Presumably, where 
DNA evidence is relevant in a capital case, it will, in most instances, 
be tested before the state executes. Thus, Rudolph Holton goes free. 
A relative few of us might be outraged that a man could spend six-
teen years of life on death row for a crime he did not commit, but the 
story hardly has the front page and system-destabilizing potential 
that executing an innocent person would have. On the other hand, 
Ricky Nolen McGinn is executed. The good guy goes free, the bad guy 
dies—we know this because DNA tells us so. 
 As long as this scenario continues to prevail, the tide that is now 
shifting toward moratoria or even abolition may soon recede back to 
a solid support for capital punishment. Such a recession would, in 
failing the test of skepticism, continue to entrust what is perhaps the 
greatest of all powers to a fallible government. The next Part argues 
that the only truly skeptical approach to the issue of capital punish-
ment is to deprive the government of so great a power.  
VI.   ANSWERING THE CALL OF SKEPTICISM 
A.   A Second-Best Solution: A Somewhat Skeptical Response to 
Capital Punishment 
 In the recent film, The Life of David Gale,171 Gale, the abolitionist, 
is challenged at one point by the quasi-fictionalized governor of 
Texas to name for him just one innocent person whom his state has 
executed. The governor declares that, if Gale can do so, he will im-
mediately issue a moratorium. Gale is speechless.  
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 The fictional governor’s confidence is not without a real-life ana-
logue. Jeb Bush, in the face of what many consider a flawed system 
of capital punishment in Florida, remains confident that, in his state, 
only the “deserving” are executed.172 Implicitly, Bush has challenged 
abolitionists and other reformers, like the fictional Gale, to find the 
person who was not “deserving,” the person executed by the state of 
Florida who was actually innocent. While, practically speaking, find-
ing this person could be the stake that finally pierces through the 
heart of capital punishment once and for all, it is not necessary as a 
basis for responding either to Gale’s fictional governor or to the real 
Governor Bush.  
 In the movie, Gale has nothing to say in response to the governor. 
It is a strange silence for Gale, a professor of philosophy and appar-
ent admirer of Socrates. 173 A simple Socratic reply for Gale might 
have been: “Governor, I cannot point to any executed person who has 
been proven innocent. However, because it has not been proven, does 
that necessarily mean that it has not happened? And, more specifi-
cally, how, Governor, do you know with absolute certainty that you 
have never signed a death warrant for an innocent person?” Had this 
been Gale’s response, the presumably conservative governor, at the 
very least, would have been forced into an uncomfortable discussion 
about the appropriate level of trust to place in government power. At 
most, he would have been left as speechless as Gale. Perhaps, it is 
the risk of such a dialogue that helps to explain why, when Governor 
Bush has been challenged to debate by one of Florida’s foremost abo-
litionists, he has declined.174  
 Imagine, however, that the fictional governor, in a moment of in-
tellectual honesty, replies: “Professor Gale, I can’t answer your ques-
tion . . . It surely gives me pause for thought . . . I am, after all, just a 
human being . . . how can I know anything with absolute cer-
tainty?”175 But just as Gale begins to crack a triumphant smile, the 
governor continues: “Professor Gale, maybe you’re right. We’ve been 
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doing things the wrong way—too much power in the hands of folks 
like me who, every now and again, make mistakes.” But, he stops, 
thinks for a moment, and continues: “But that doesn’t mean we have 
to throw the baby out with the bathwater, does it? I mean there’s this 
DNA stuff, right? We rely on it to let people off death row. Why can’t 
we rely on it to execute people? What if this state agreed not to exe-
cute anyone unless DNA proves a person guilty first?” Perhaps again, 
Gale is left with nothing to say. 
 Once more, however, there is a possible response. For now, 
though, it is worth mentioning that, from a skeptical perspective, the 
fictional governor’s compromise certainly would be far more accept-
able than the present system. It at least attempts to resolve the issue 
of factual uncertainty by replacing fallible human discretion with a 
reasonably certain science. Within this framework, the risk of execut-
ing an innocent person would probably diminish. Even a scientifi-
cally-clothed system of capital punishment, though, still fails the test 
of skepticism. 
 First, regardless of how reliable DNA technology becomes, it is ul-
timately only as dependable as the human beings who use it. As with 
fingerprinting and other technologies, DNA testing is susceptible to 
human error and even manipulation. Much like DNA now, finger-
printing was once considered “foolproof.”176 This perception enabled 
much official corruption, and consequently, the destruction of many 
innocent lives. 177 Thus, one author well-versed in this subject has 
urged:  
Precautions should be taken to ensure that forensic DNA evidence 
receives ongoing scrutiny from the courts, the defense bar, and the 
scientific community and is not turned into a black box whose con-
clusions are treated as unassailable, error-free gospel.178 
In recent times, the O.J. Simpson trial serves as the most well-
known example of how individuals within the criminal justice system 
are capable, either by virtue of incompetence or corruption, to make 
an otherwise reliable science unreliable. The issue in the Simpson 
trial was not whether to trust DNA technology, but rather, whether 
to trust the persons responsible for handling the DNA. Although ef-
forts are being made to curb potential corruption, the fact remains 
that it is possible—in other words, DNA, like fingerprinting before it, 
is not “foolproof.”  
 Secondly, DNA is of no value in ascertaining key elements in capi-
tal crimes and sentencing. DNA might prove that a defendant killed, 
but it cannot tell a jury whether the defendant intended to kill or 
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whether his killing was “heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”179 These mat-
ters are still left to the more or less subjective determinations of ju-
ries. This relates to the final problem with placing too much empha-
sis on DNA testing. For all its worth, DNA can do nothing to remedy 
the disproportionate application of the death penalty to racial and 
economic minorities. In Illinois, where the nation’s renewed debate 
on capital punishment first surfaced, Governor Ryan noted that 35 
African-Americans were convicted and sentenced to death by all-
white juries. 180 If DNA had been available in all of these cases, it 
could have done nothing, short of proving the defendants’ innocence, 
to mitigate the potential of racism as a factor in whether these men 
would be condemned to die. To address a problem like that, a much 
more drastic response is needed—a more skeptical response is 
needed.  
B.   Best Solution: A Truly Skeptical Response to Capital Punishment 
 As noted, DNA is hardly a panacea for the woes of capital pun-
ishment. Most significantly, from a skeptical perspective, DNA can-
not cure fallible human government. Thus, at best, we are left with a 
better system, not an infallible one. In some areas of government—
education, taxes, even criminal justice for the most part—it is only 
rational, and hardly immoral, to accept the inevitability of imperfec-
tion. “Death,” however, is “different.” From this, we might ask how 
different? In other words, might we risk the death of some innocents 
for the good of society?  
 These questions are ultimately moral in nature. But, while the 
question of whether death might serve as an acceptable means to an 
arguably larger end may make for good philosophical discussion, it is 
not really a subject for serious debate in this society. Rather, the 
capital punishment debate has focused not on whether it is moral to 
kill an innocent person, but instead on whether we are, in fact, tak-
ing any such risk.181 Those that support capital punishment say that 
                                                                                                                  
 179. See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia’s Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 94-99 
(1992) (explaining the difficulty of applying standards such as the “heinous, atrocious, and 
cruel” (HAC) one, which is used in Florida). 
 180. Governor Explains, supra note 99, at 2. 
 181. Some have, however, raised the argument that risking the lives of the innocent is, 
indeed, morally justified. Despite its apparent irrelevance, the execute at our own-moral 
risk position may at least score some points for intellectual honesty. It proceeds as follows: 
  One of the most common, and surely the most persuasive, arguments against 
capital punishment is that the state may execute an innocent person. One rea-
son for its effectiveness is that proponents of capital punishment often do not 
know how to respond to it.  
 That’s a shame. Fo r while the argument is emotionally compelling, it is mor-
ally and intellectually shallow.  
 First of all, there is almost no major social good that does not lead to the 
death of innocent individuals. Over a million innocent people have been killed 
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we are not. It is a position, however, that is grounded in faith, not 
certitude.182  
 To those politically entrusted with the choice, there is an alterna-
tive. To prove the efficacy of the death penalty in the face of evidence 
(i.e., exonerations) to the contrary, confident governors and legisla-
tures have a means to shut up naysayers—they can simply freeze 
executions, closely examine the system, and report back to those who 
insist there is something wrong that, in fact, all is well—when this 
process is complete, they can resume executions. This, from the skep-
tical (and the abolitionist) perspective, would be a step in the right 
direction for states like Florida. Inevitably, though, it seems that it is 
a step that, if taken sincerely, can only lead to abolition.183  
 Illinois is not unique. Systems of capital punishment, wherever 
they may be, are like all other human institutions: “fraught with er-
ror.” States may do much, as they often do with a range of issues, to 
become more competent in their administration of capital punish-
ment. But increased competence is where the hope ends. For the 
state serious in its opposition to taking “innocent” life, certainty—not 
competence—should be the requisite threshold. To be certain that 
death is not visited upon the innocent, there is but one option. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 To be consistent, the skeptic can no more say that innocent people 
are being killed than she can say that they are not. It is enough, 
though, for a society that purports to respect life, to recognize it is 
operating a system that runs the risk of killing the innocent. States 
might reasonably look to procedural reforms, but, in the end, they 
                                                                                                                  
and maimed in car accidents. Would this argue for the banning of automobiles? 
To those whose criterion for acceptable social policy is that not one innocent 
die, it should.  
 If it were proven that a strictly enforced 40-miles-per-hour speed limit on our 
nation’s highways would save innocent lives, should we reduce highway limits 
to 40 miles per hour? Should all roller coasters be shut down because some in-
nocents get killed riding on them? 
Dennis Prager, More Innocents Die When We Don’t Have Capital Punishment (June 17, 
2003), at http://www.townhall.com/columnists/dennisprager/dp20030617.shtml (last visited 
Dec. 6, 2003); see also Wesley Lowe, Wesley Lowe’s Pro Death Penalty Webpage, at 
http://www.wesleylowe.com/cp.html#risk (last visited Dec. 6, 2003). Lowe quotes a U.S. 
Senate Report which states: “All that can be expected of . . . [human authorities] is that 
they take every reasonable precaution against the danger of error . . . If errors are . . . 
made, this is the necessary price that must be paid within a socie ty which is made up of 
human beings.” Id. Judging, however, from the insistence of Governors like Jeb Bush that 
they have never signed death warrants for the un-“deserving,” it is doubtful the U.S. Sen-
ate Report reflects the norms of national or local constituencies regarding the value of in-
nocent life. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.  
 182. See NEITZSCHE, supra note 1, § 344, at 283. 
 183. This assumes, of course, that all is not well and that a close examination of any 
capital punishment system would reveal as much. 
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only return us to the same fundamental problem that prompted calls 
for reform in the first instance: We human beings cannot be sure that 
the reforms we implement are not flawed, nor can we ensure that 
even the best reforms will withstand the prospect of further human 
error. Thus, cognizant of our fallibility, we are left with a moral di-
lemma: Is the prospect of death for the innocent an acceptable price 
for continuing to operate a fallible, and arguably quite flawed, sys-
tem of capital punishment?  
 
